In a gradual process from the end of World War Two, culminating in a significant set of constitutional changes in the 1980s, executive government of the Isle of Man passed from the Lieutenant-Governor, who was responsible to the Crown, to the Council of Ministers, who were responsible initially to Tynwald, and later to the House of Keys. How do votes of no confidence fit into this?
Non-statutory votes of confidence and no confidence.
Members of Tynwald may propose, and then vote upon, votes of no confidence in a range of different office holders and bodies. In 2013, for instance, Mr Skelly moved a motion “That Tynwald has no confidence in Hon. David Anderson MHK as Minister for Health“. The motion was debated at length in Tynwald, and lost 7 to 17 in the Keys, but passed 8 to 1 in the Council. As the Branches were in disagreement, the motion failed. Had the motion been passed, Mr Anderson would not have lost office, as the decision as to who is a minister is made (formally) by the Lieutenant-Governor and (actually) by the Chief Minister. We can find unsuccessful motions of no confidence in individual ministers not only in Tynwald, but in the Keys alone – for instance Mr David Cannan’s 2006 no confidence vote in Mr Braidwood in relation to decisions made as Home Affairs Minister, put forward as an amendment to a resolution on a report including discussion of his role. This vote was also lost, 14 to 9. We can also find non-parliamentarians subject to these motions. A motion of no confidence in the Manx Electricity Authority was tabled for the Tynwald of May 2005, then withdrawn, followed immediately afterwards by the resignation of all members of the MEA (discussed fully in DG Kermode’s excellent book on Ministerial Government in the Isle of Man).
These votes are potentially powerful political blows, and may lead to political consequences. As well as the mass resignation of the MEA in 2005, Kermode sees the resignation of Allan Bell as DTLT Minister in 1994 as forestalling a motion of no confidence; and we might also consider the resignation of Richard Corkill as Chief Minister following concerns after his arrest as happening in the shadow of a vote of no confidence. We can also see votes of confidence deployed as political tools. In 1998 Edgar Quine put forward a vote of confidence in CoMin, which passed and so showed confidence in Donald Gelling’s CoMin.
These are clearly important politically, but they do not have the statutory force of a vote of no confidence under the Council of Ministers Act 1990.
The statutory vote of no confidence.
Under the 1990 Act, one of the ways in which a Chief Minister can lose that office is if there should be “a sitting of the House of Keys at which a resolution is passed by the affirmative vote of at least 13 members of the House of Keys, that it has no confidence in the Council of Ministers” (s.2(3)(b)). If the Chief Minister goes out of office as a result of such a vote being passed, then every Minister also goes out of office (s.3(3)). It is worth stressing that while individual ministers may retain the confidence of the Keys, the statutory vote is an all-or-nothing process: There is no statutory power to remove just the Chief Minister, or just an individual Minister.
Section 2(3) has undergone some significant changes in recent years. In 2018 the power to remove a Council of Ministers by a vote of no confidence was removed from Tynwald as a body, and transferred to the House of Keys only. In 2018, however, there was an unusually high special majority required, providing far greater protection for the executive than in other small democracies I studied at the time. Concerns that the balance between stability and accountability had been struck at the wrong place led in 2021 to a change in the rules, from a special majority of 16 to 13. It should be noted however that a vote of no confidence requires 13 MHKs to support it, rather than a majority of the MHKs who vote. So it is only a simple majority if all 24 MHKs are present at the sitting.
If a vote of no confidence secures 13 or more votes, then the Chief Minister and Council of Ministers remain in post until they are replaced (s.4(4), 4(5)).
A sitting of the Keys must be held between 17 and 21 days after the vote of no confidence, at which a Chief Minister is appointed by the Keys, and the Chief Minister then goes on to appoint their Ministers. In the same way as after a General Election, nominations for the office of Chief Minister are put to the House of Keys not less than seven days before this sitting, with a written statement on the policies the candidate intends to pursue being submitted not less than five days before the sitting (see Standing Orders of the House of Keys, section 12). There is no legal bar on the same Chief Minister being reappointed, and then going on to appoint the same Ministers (s.4(6)).
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